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Atheist	Sean	Penn,	in	one	of	his	gripping	‘webisodes’,	boldly	opens	one	day	by	claiming	that	there	is	
no	such	thing	as	an	agnostic-	that	they	are	all	really	atheists.	His	point	is	that	an	atheist	is	someone	
who	does	not	believe	in	a	God,	as	opposed	to	the	agnostic	stance	of	not	knowing.	No	one	really	
knows,	he	says,	but	theism	and	atheism	deal	with	belief,	and	if	you’re	‘not	sure’	whether	there’s	a	
God,	to	him	that’s	the	same	as	not	believing	that	there	is.	A.C	Grayling	made	a	similar	point	in	his	
talk	at	a	recent	AHS	conference,	stating	that	atheism	is	not	‘believing	there	isn’t	a	God’,	but	rather	
‘not	believing	there	is	a	God’.	Re-read	it,	there	is	an,	apparently	important,	distinction.	
So	where	does	this	leave	the	agnostic?	Should	we	all	just	bite	the	bullet	and	embrace	atheism,	as	by	
not	being	sure,	we	surely	do	not	currently	believe	in	a	God?	If	only	it	were	that	simple.	The	main	
problem	with	the	above	is	one	which	plagues	any	debate	concerning	religion	and	secularism:	
reasoning.	Mr	Penn	is	making	an	assumption	that	the	human	mind	is	logical	and	reasonable,	he’s	
assuming	that	this	holds	even	when	our	minds	are	exploring	a	concept	that	is	for	all	intents	and	
purposes	squarely	outside	the	boundaries	of	such	notions.	He	is	assuming	there	is	a	firm	divide	
between	belief	and	lack	of.	
Agnosticism	is	the	often	untold	story,	forgotten	or	drowned	out	by	fevered	religious	exhortations	
and	rabid	atheist	postulations.	Agnostics	are	often	seen	as	not	having	much	to	offer	the	debate,	
being	by	definition	rather	uncertain	about	things.	This	can,	however,	lead	to	the	debate	at	times	
becoming	rather	skewed,	swinging	between	moral	condemnations	from	pompous	theists,	to	
arrogant	sneering	from	haughty	atheists.	Perhaps	an	understanding	of	why	some	agnostics	remain	
as	they	do	can	help	encourage	a	more	balanced	perception	of	both	sides.	Perhaps	agnosticism	does	
have	something	to	add	to	the	debate	after	all.	
Penn	and	Grayling's	reasonable	approach	to	the	topic	assumes	a	likewise	equally	rational	and	
understandable	approach	from	all,	but	sadly	this	is	not	the	case.	I'm	an	agnostic	because	I'm	
confused.	I'm	an	agnostic	because	I	do	not	know	the	answers	to	these	cosmic	and	eternal	questions,	
but	also	because	I	do	not	know	my	own	mind:	belief	and	non-belief	is	not	a	binary,	it’s	a	continuum.	
Some	days	God	and	religion	seems	plausible	and	appealing,	other	days	they	don’t:	should	I	therefore	
call	myself	atheist	one	day	and	theist	the	next?	Or	should	we	accept	that	there	is	not	a	firmly	policed	
line,	despite	the	best	intentions	of	both	sides?		
My	agnosticism	extends	far	beyond	just	pondering	the	existence	of	a	deity	or	indeed	historical	
figures.	It	wrestles	with	the	benefits	and	the	drawbacks	of	organised	religion,	with	tradition	and	
authority	and	hierarchy,	and	with	whether	I	could	ever	reconcile	faith	with	my	otherwise	science-
orientated	mind.	Let	me	explain.	
It	is	popular	now	to	say	that	you're	not	religious,	but	rather	spiritual.		Indeed,	it	is	popular	for	the	
scholar	and	layman	alike	to	define	the	distinction	between	the	two	as	religion	being	organised	and	
impersonal,	whereas	the	spiritual	is	personal	and	private.	Paragament	(1999)	cautions	against	this	
dichotomy,	for	he	believes	it	really	suggests	that	religion	is	bad	and	spirituality	good,	also	ignoring	
the	complexities	of	both	(there	are	many	spiritual	practices	within	religion,	for	instance).	This	may	
not	be	an	entirely	accurate	conception.	Protestantism	is	often	linked	to	the	rise	in	individualism	in	
the	West,	sowing	the	seeds	for	capitalism	and	modern	society,	whereas	many	'spiritual'	practices	
such	as	meditation	that	have	gained	popularity	in	the	West	actually	seek	to	deny	the	very	idea	of	the	
Self,	to	create	a	greater	harmony	with	those	around	us	or	some	cosmic	entity.	Hodge	&	McGrew	
(2006)	found	9	definitions	for	spirituality	and	12	for	religion	during	telephone	surveys,	suggesting	
that,	conversely,	if	the	term	‘religion’	generates	a	greater	disparity	in	understandings,	it	may	be	the	
more	personal	of	the	two.	
Levin	(2001)	explains	how	certain	religious	practices	can	be	quite	healthy,	such	as	Muslim	and	Jewish	
dietary	requirements	and	Mormons	rejection	of	alcohol	and	smoking.	Jonathan	Haidt	in	his	ground	
breaking	book	on	moral	psychology	'The	Righteous	Mind'	points	to	research	that	suggests	that	those	
individuals	of	a	religious	bent	are	much	more	likely	to	be	active	in	their	communities,	and	more	likely	
to	donate	time,	money	and	even	blood	than	their	secular	counterparts.	Even	Susan	Blackmore,	of	
the	Dawkins/Dennett	mindset	of	religion	as	a	‘virus’	(an	unfortunate	foray	of	an	otherwise	brilliant	
expansion	of	the	theory	of	memetics)	has	retracted	her	claims	in	recent	years,	accepting	that,	by	and	
large,	religious	people	seem	to	live	longer,	healthier	and	happier	lives.			
Haidt's	grand	thesis	goes	on	to	suggest	that	there	are	6	universal	and	fundamental	moral	
foundations	that	human	morality	is	based	upon:	Care,	Liberty,	Fairness,	Loyalty,	Authority	and	
Sanctity.	He	believes	that	religion	is	entwined	with	the	last	3	particularly,	and	that	any	attempt	to	
understand	it	without	an	appreciation	of	the	social	utility	that	these	3	foundations	have	is	doomed	
to	failure:	simply	critiquing	the	plausibility	of	a	deity	is	always	going	to	miss	the	mark	for	religious	
people	because	there	religion	is	about	more	than	just	God.	The	sense	of	community,	companionship	
and	belonging	derived	from	religious	communities	is	an	integral	part	to	its	allure,	and	a	genuine	
social	good	that	cannot	be	dismissed.		
And	yet	I	cannot	ignore	the	many	examples	of	religion	being	stuck	in	a	regressive,	oppressive	past,	
with	Christianity	and	Islam's	stances	on	homosexuality	and	gender	equality	being	brought	to	mind,	
as	well	as	the	highly	restricting	nature	of	many	Amish	communities	and	their	counterparts	and	lesser	
examples	being	prevalent	in	many	other	religions	and	places.	What	of	the	appalling	actions	of	ISIS?	
To	be	sure	these	fundamentalists	are	in	no	way	representative	of	mainstream	Islam,	but	it	would	be	
wrong	to	deny	that	religion	plays	a	part	in	their	ideology.	And	what	of	an	organisation	that	is	
representative	of	a	religion?	The	Vatican,	I'm	sure,	has	provided	solace	to	many	practising	Catholics	
throughout	the	centuries,	but	it	also	has	a	history	mired	by	deceit,	corruption	and	hypocrisy,	as	well	
as	being	a	great	source	of	suffering	throughout	medieval	Europe.	
Needless	to	say,	my	views	on	the	usefulness	and	morality	of	organised	religion	are	mixed	and	
confused.	As	naturally	left-of-centre	politically	I	have	an	inherent	(and,	I	believe,	healthy)	distrust	of	
authority	and	hierarchy,	but	through	reading	Haidt’s	work	and	personal	experience	I	can	sort	of	see	
why	they	are	useful	and	beneficial	things	for	society	to	have,	in	moderation.	Does	this	mean	I	must	
take	the	atheist	proclamation	of	complete	freedom	of	thought	and	a	breakdown	of	religious	
hierarchies	and	inhibitions	with	a	pinch	of	salt?	They	are	arguments	that	naturally	appeal	to	my	
sense	of	justice	and	aversion	to	oppression,	but	in	their	extreme	they	may	risk	losing	something	in	
their	hunger	for	liberation.		
And	what	of	the	underlying	mentality	of	religion,	its	hidden	driver:	faith?	Is	it	virtue	or	vice?	Many	
times	I	have	shared	the	atheist’s	exasperation	at	the	unthinking	nature	of	many	religious	beliefs	and	
practices.	The	Enlightenment	really	did	free	our	minds	and	provide	a	powerful	catalyst	for	an	
explosion	in	scientific	and	philosophical	progress.	The	old	adage	of	Socrates	that	‘the	unexamined	
life	is	not	worth	living’	speaks	strongly	to	me,	and	the	audacity	of	questioning	established	
orthodoxies	to	me	is	a	noble	and	important	contribution	from	atheism.	I	can,	however,	also	see	
some	merit	to	faith:	often	having	faith	is	portrayed	as	a	commendable	attribute	and	I	can	sort	of	
understand	why,	if	only	in	certain	circumstances.	Blind	faith	feels	distinctly	wrong	to	me,	but	this	
caricature	of	the	religious	zealot	is,	in	my	experience,	not	all	that	common.	Most	(although	perhaps	
not	all)	religious	people	I	have	met	seem	to	have	something	to	base	their	faith	on,	it	is	just	often	
something	that	the	atheist	finds	easy	to	dismiss.	
Some,	in	true	Aristotelian	fashion,	offer	a		third	way,	explaining	that	religion	and	belief	served	a	
purpose	for	a	time,	but	just	as	feudalism	paved	the	way	for	capitalism,	the	time	of	invoking	deities	
and	mysticism	in	order	to	understand	the	world	is	over	now-	science	has	got	it	covered.	But	even	
this	apparent	compromise	still	falls	down	on	the	side	of	relegating	faith	to	a	mode	of	thinking	that	
must	be	overcome.	So	which	is	it?	Is	faith	a	vital	aspect	of	the	human	condition	for	understanding	
the	world	and	developing	oneself,	or	an	unacceptable	betrayal	of	human	intellect	and	ability?	
Many,	though	I’m	sure	not	all,	atheists	presume	their	school	of	thought	has	a	monopoly	on	logic	and	
reason,	whilst	religion	is	the	bastion	of	superstition	and	blind	faith.	This	dichotomy	is	simply	false.	
Many	thinkers	traditionally	associated	with	the	Enlightenment,	that	great	social	innovation	that	
placed	reason	and	evidence	on	the	throne	of	human	thought,	were	firm	believers	in	the	Judea-
Christian	God	(just	have	a	brief	read	of	Burke,	Locke	or	Hobbes).	The	‘Ancient	Enlightenment’	that	
saw	figures	such	as	the	Buddha	and	Socrates	place	reason	above	all	else	was	also	plagued	by	
religious	believers.	Although	Socrates	was	not	beyond	questioning	the	Gods,	he	seems	not	to	have	
questioned	much	their	existence,	with	some	scholars	even	suggesting	that	he	believed	himself	to	be	
on	a	‘divine	mission’.	Even	today	many	scientists	hold	firm	beliefs	in	a	God,	and	many	atheists	
choose	to	place	their	faith	in	something,	even	if	it	is	not	a	deity.	
The	traditional	antithesis	to	faith	is	often	seen	to	be	empiricism:	acquiring	knowledge	of	the	world	
through	observation	and	evidence.	Thus	is	the	image	of	Darwin	conjured	up,	collecting	his	samples	
on	the	Galapagos	Islands,	back	bent	and	magnifying	glass	in	hand.	Whilst	I	consider	myself	a	
scientist,	I	am	still	perfectly	happy	to	accept	that	empiricism	itself	rests	upon	an	assumption	that	is	
taken	as	a	matter	of	faith	by	even	the	most	ardent	of	scientists.	Quite	simply	we	assume	that	
observation	is	the	best	way	to	understand	the	universe,	without	any	real	robust	defence	for	doing	
so.	We	have	faith	in	the	explanatory	and	predicative	ability	of	empiricism,	but	we	have	no	way,	
ironically,	of	empirically	proving	that	it	is	better	than	anything	else.	Indeed,	evidence	we	do	have	
suggests	a	rather	different	conclusion.	
The	idea	of	rational,	objective	human	beings	has	been	eroded	away	slowly	by	a	wealth	of	
psychological	and	sociological	revelations.	Culture,	language,	political	and	religious	ideology,	power	
relations,	and	social	conventions	as	well	as	many	other	factors	can	all	wield	a	powerful	and	often	
invisible	influence	over	research,	and	act	to	undermine	this	false	sense	of	objective	impersonality	
that	science	often	parades	under	(Alvesson	&	Sköldberg,	2009).	But	psychology	has	revealed	deeper	
threats	to	humanity’s	capacity	for	empiricism	than	this.	One	need	only	be	vaguely	familiar	with	
recent	advances	in;	reasoning	(Kahneman,	2008);	eye-witness	testimony	(Malpass	&	Devine,	1981,	
Siegelle	&	Loftus,	1978);	visual	perception	(Balcetis	&	Dunning,	2006),	unconscious	processes	
(Wilson,	2003)	and	attention	(Lavie,	2005)	to	name	but	a	few	to	realise	just	how	fundamental	an	
objection	to	our	empirical	capacities	modern	psychology	has	raised.	Through	all	of	these	and	more	
we	are	prevented	from	seeing	an	exact,	objective	reality.		
But	assuming	we	could	somehow	transcend	these	inherent	‘flaws’	in	our	epistemological	
capabilities,	would	empiricism	then	have	its	day?	The	startling	revelations	of	quantum	physics	have	
shown	us	empirically	that	the	observer	matters,	that	the	very	act	of	observation	itself	changes	
reality	(Rae,	2004).	As	the	saying	goes,	if	you	think	you	understand	quantum	mechanics	then	you	
definitely	don’t,	but	one	thing	we	can	be	sure	in	is	that	it	has	dispelled	the	myth	of	a	detached,	
neutral	observer,	merely	recording	how	the	universe	is	going	by	without	exerting	any	influence	at	
all.	Whilst	it	is	still	unclear	just	how	quantum	events	relate	to	macroscopic	objects	(i.e	humans)	it	is	
already	offering	profound	challenges	for	the	studious	Darwins	of	the	world.		
But	what	of	all	the	progress	that	the	empirical	method	has	brought	about?	Since	freeing	ourselves	
from	dogmatic	adherence	to	religious	orthodoxy	(or	at	the	very	least,	those	who	sought	to	abuse	it),	
we	certainly	do,	as	already	mentioned,	seem	to	have	made	incredible	advances	in	almost	all	fields	of	
human	endeavour.	This	certainly	shows	that	empiricism	has	value	but	it	in	no	way	proves	that	it	is	
the	only,	or	even	the	best,	way	of	exploring	and	understanding	the	universe.	It	is	perfectly	possible	
that	there	are	a	set	number	of	things	empiricism	can	discover,	whilst	many	more	may	lie	outside	of	
its	limitations.	We	have	made	great	progress	in	the	realms	that	empiricism	can	explore,	but	what	of	
outside	these	areas?	Quite	simply,	we	may	not	even	know	what	it	is	we	don’t	know.	
Nobel	Prize	winner	Daniel	Kahnemann	in	his	book	‘Thinking:	Fast	and	Slow’	describes	our	
‘shortcomings’	with	a	beautifully	simplistic	analogy.	Our	minds	work	in	two	ways-	System	1	and	
System	2.	System	1	is	what	is	driving	us	most	of	the	time-	it	guides	us	through	our	daily	lives,	helping	
us	perform	the	majority	of	our	tasks,	navigating	our	environments	with	our	pre-programmed	‘world-
view’.	It	is	only	when	something	contrary	to	our	world	view	is	shoved	in	our	faces,	or	we	stumble	
across	something	that	requires	a	bit	more	thought	(such	as,	hopefully,	reading	this)	that	System	2	
kicks	in.	This	is	the	part	of	our	mind	that	deduces,	that	reasons,	and	the	result	of	this	reasoning	is	an	
altered	‘world-view’	operating	system	for	System	1.	
Piaget	called	this	a	process	of	assimilation	and	accommodation	and	this	is	telling.	When	you	
accommodate	something	in	your	world	view,	it	means	you	have	to	make	room	for	it,	rejigging	what	
was	already	there.	But	when	you	assimilate,	you’re	not	really	changing	anything,	you’re	bending	the	
information	to	your	world-view.	And	how	often	do	we	do	this?	How	often	do	we	allow,	without	even	
realising	it,	our	System	1	to	completely	bypass	contrary	information.	Studies	show	we	are	more	
likely	to	acknowledge	information	that	confirms	our	views,	whilst	gloss	over	that	that	does	not.	
Important	work	by	Ash	shows	that	we	alter	our	views	based	on	societal	pressure,	and	Milgram	
infamously	showed	how	we	do	this	in	deference	to	authority.	There	is	a	wealth	of	psychological	
research	out	there	to	show	how	identifying	with	a	certain	social	group	alters	our	perceptions	of	
those	both	in	and	out	of	the	group.	The	field	of	‘visual	perception’	has	made	some	amazing	
discoveries	about	how	easy	it	can	be	to	trick	a	human	being	into	seeing	something	that	isn’t	there,	
or	not	seeing	something	that	is.		
Does	accepting	our	limited	capacity	for	reasoning	allow	room	for	faith?	It	may	not	prove	the	virtue	
of	faith,	but	it	certainly	evidences	its	inevitability.	Humans	are	by	nature	a	curious	breed:	we	have	to	
know,	to	explore,	to	discover.	If,	however,	we	have	a	limited	capacity	in	what	we	can	determine	
empirically,	then	we	will	simply	have	to	opt	to	believe	or	have	faith	in	certain	things,	or	risk	being	
paralysed	by	indecision.	Many	researchers	have	discarded	the	old	notion	that	emotion	is	opposed	to	
reason,	opting	to	see	emotion	rather	as	something	that	can	work	in	tandem	with	reason:	if	we	did	
not	have	emotions	we	would	be	often	be	unable	to	act,	or	we	would	make	very	socially	
unacceptable	decisions.	Could	faith	also	come	to	be	understood	as	an	accompaniment,	rather	than	
an	adversary,	of	reason,	like	emotions	have?	
Faith	can	also	play	an	important	role	in	directing	our	behaviour.	Whilst	uneasy	about	a	faith	in	a	
supreme	deity	that	is	devoid	of	evidence	or	even	reason,	I	must	admit	that	I	do	not	apply	this	
uneasiness	equally.	Part	of	me	feels	the	pull	of	the	stirring	defence	of	reason	and	empiricism,	and	
the	Latin	phrase	‘Sapere	Aude’	(dare	to	know)	resonates	strongly	with	me:	I	admire	the	atheists	that	
fight	for	freedom	of	thought	and	speech	and	refuse	to	accept	limits	to	what	we	can	do.	But	I	do	have	
faith	in	certain	things.	I	have	a	rather	unusual	but	equally	unshakable	faith	in	humans.	I	believe	that	
both	on	an	individual	and	a	species	level	that	we	can	be	a	force	for	good,	and	deserve	another	
chance	no	matter	how	depraved	our	sins	(interesting	choice	of	word	for	an	agnostic).	I	have	precious	
little	evidence	on	which	to	base	this	on	(indeed,	after	obtaining	a	Psychology	degree	I	have	plenty	to	
the	contrary)	but	it	remains	with	me	nonetheless.	I	could	be	completely	wrong	about	this,	but	it	
doesn’t	really	matter,	because	it	is	how	it	makes	me	act	that	is	important.	This	faith,	whether	
misplaced	or	not,	means	I	approach	fellow	human	beings,	most	of	the	time,	believing	that	they	can	
be	a	force	for	good	and	treat	them	accordingly.		
So,	despite	Penn's	and	Grayling's	protestations,	I	am	truly	an	agnostic,	at	least	for	the	time	being.	
Because	of	the	questions	raging	in	my	mind	and	the	convoluted,	confusing	nature	of	the	human	
condition,	it	is	not	a	simple	case	of	either	believing	or	not	believing.	I	do	not	truly	know	the	answers	
to	these	questions	about	God’s	existence,	nor	about	whether	faith	is	a	good	or	a	bad	thing,	nor	
whether	religion	does	actually	have	something	to	offer	us…	but	I	also	do	not	even	know	my	own	
mind	when	it	comes	to	them.	Some	of	us,	although	we	may	be	a	smaller	subset	than	is	often	
realised,	genuinely	don't	fall	into	the	category	of	belief	or	non-belief,	or	at	least	our	conscious	selves	
don’t	(who	knows	what’s	going	on	in	the	unconscious:	can	you	have	an	unconscious	belief?).	Some	
of	us	are	genuinely	stuck	in	some	sort	of	murky,	muddled	middle	ground,	unsure	of	our	own	
opinions	or	even	our	own	minds.		
Timothy	Wilson	talks	of	how	we	are	'Strangers	to	Ourselves'	(as	his	book	is	titled),	how	we	often	are	
unaware	of	a	large	part	of	what's	going	on	in	our	own	minds,	how	small	a	role	our	consciousness	can	
play.	Kahnemann	too,	in	his	talk	of	System	1	and	System	2	highlights	how	small	a	segment	of	human	
thought	reasoning	actually	takes	up	and	Jonathan	Haidt	demonstrates	how	much	of	what	we	call	
reasoning	is	merely	post	hoc	confabulations	to	defend	a	viewpoint	reached	by	automatic,	often	
emotive	means.	Could	it	be	possible,	in	light	of	these	theories,	that	we	can	come	sometimes	to	not	
really	understand	our	own	beliefs,	and	therefore	truly	be	agnostic?	And	can	an	understanding	of	
how	this	is	so	also	translate	into	an	important	point	to	bear	in	mind	when	considering	the	virtue	of	
faith	in	an	uncertain	world?	As	ever,	I	am	still	unsure,	but	hopefully	you	can	begin	to	reach	towards	
some	conclusions	for	yourself.	
	
